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ABSTRACT
Decisions to behave in particular ways depend on beliefs, social norms, perceived constraints, and
attitudes. Recently, this perspective has been expanded to consider the role of moral obligations in such
decisions. Largely ignored are the possible interrelations among moral obligations to significant others and
significant others’ influences as they interact to affect decisions. This is of particular interest when a strong
moral obligation toward a significant other is associated with strong behavioral expectations by that same
significant other. We investigated the interrelations among moral obligations to, and behavioral expectations
from, 11 types of significant others in the cattle feeding industry to determine their joint influences on attitudes
toward antibiotic use and recommendations for antibiotics in feedlot cattle, drawing data from a random sample
of feedlot veterinarians (n=103). Results show that subjective norms and a sense of moral obligation affect both
the attitudes toward, and the recommendations for, the use of antibiotics in feedlot cattle. We found several
significant interactions among subjective norms and moral obligations, which suggests that perceived moral
obligations to peers, clients, and the regulatory norm-setting sector associated with the feedlot industry
increase the impact of social pressures from those sectors on the recommendation to use antibiotics in acutely
sick, chronically sick, and high-risk feedlot cattle.
The use of antibiotics in animal agriculture is an important issue not only for
animal health and agricultural profitability but also for human health (Rollin 2001).
Animal antibiotic use is thought to have a significant impact on the emergence of
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antibiotic resistance in pathogenic bacteria found in food animals (Smith et al.
2002), which could affect human health. As a result, many scientists and medical
professionals have advocated for restrictions on the use of certain types of
antibiotics in animal agriculture (Aarestrup and Wegener 1999; Khachatourians
1998; Witte 1998), while others have strongly encouraged the elimination of certain
classes of antibiotics in food animals, particularly when used as growth promotants
(Gorbach 2001; Gourmelen 2001; U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2009). Food
companies have alertly attempted to market to the public’s fears regarding either
antibiotic residues or resistant-bacteria in meats by promoting “antibiotic-free”
products (see the Tyson Foods 2009 press release). Several studies dealing with
physicians’ antibiotic prescribing patterns have found differences among physicians
from various specialties with respect to antibiotic use and knowledge about
resistance (Srinivasan et al. 2004). A few studies have investigated veterinarians’
attitudes and beliefs concerning antibiotic use (e.g., Busani et al. 2004).  However,
these have been atheoretical in nature and thus have not tested the model we put
forth in the present paper. The limited published research on antibiotic use in the
cattle-feeding industry demonstrates the importance of social and moral norms in
decision making (Dean and Scott 2005; McIntosh et al. 2009), but there is no
presently published work on the interplay between social and moral norms in
arriving at such decisions. 
THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR
Research concerned with the effects of beliefs, attitudes, and subjective norms
on behavior often relies on the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to explain how
intentions to behave are determined by these factors and how those intentions affect
actual behaviors (Ajzen 1991). Intentions are considered the best predictors of
behavior, and intentions, in turn, are a product of attitudes and perceived social
pressures or subjective norms. Some have suggested that intentions and behavior
may also be affected by moral obligations toward others. While some studies based
on the theory of planned behavior have examined the reasons for which physicians
prescribe antibiotics to human patients (which include social pressures) (Jackson et
al. 2006; Limbert and Lamb 2002; Walker, Grimshaw, and Armstrong 2001), these
have not considered any moral obligations to use antibiotics in patients. 
Attitudes are the product of beliefs about the costs and benefits of outcome
evaluations and are correlated with behavioral intentions. Walker et al. (2001)
argued that physicians who planned to continue prescribing antibiotics for sore
throats held different beliefs about the cost-effectiveness of antibiotics than those
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physicians who did not plan to do so. Others have found that attitudes play a
significant role in predicting physicians’ intentions to prescribe antibiotics (Limbert
and Lamb 2002).
Previous studies have shown that the link between attitudes and intentions is
usually stronger than that between subjective norms and intentions (Ajzen 1985,
1991; Terry and Hogg 1996). This means that personal beliefs and attitudes about
the outcome of that behavior usually yield greater influence than others’
expectations. However, in other research subjective norms, perceived behavioral
control, and moral obligation exhibited a greater impact on behavior than attitudes
or beliefs (Légaré et al. 2003). 
Subjective norms are: (1) the perception by actors that their significant others
expect them to behave in particular ways, combined with (2) their motivation to
comply with significant others’ expectations. Subjective norms are thus a form of
perceived social pressure. Individuals may find themselves in situations in which an
entire network of relationships may have to be taken into account, including
economic, social, and moral obligations to others in the network, before developing
an intention to behave and then behaving (Dean and Scott 2005; McIntosh et al.
2009). With feedlot veterinary medicine, the subjective norms of significant others
in the feedlot industry likely vary across conditions or circumstances of antibiotic
use and the subjective norms of one group of significant others might actually
contradict those of another group. That is, in a given circumstance, one set of
significant others (e.g., pharmaceutical companies) might strongly encourage the
use of antibiotics in feedlot cattle, while another (e.g., the consumer sector of the
food economy) might strongly oppose this use. 
Besides perceived costs and benefits of acting in a particular manner, individuals
may perceive that certain constraints prevent them from behaving in that way.
Perceived behavioral control (PBC), different from actual behavioral control, is how
an individual perceives his or her ability to perform a certain behavior, despite the
real situation. PBC is hypothesized to affect both intentions to behave and actual
behavior (Ajzen 1991). It invokes the perceptions of the availability of skills,
resources, and situational or personal opportunities, allowing a person to believe
that they are or are not able to carry out a behavior. 
MORAL OBLIGATION
The TPB perspective has begun to address the role of moral obligations in
predicting intentions and behavior. A few studies have shown that moral norms
have an impact on both intentions to behave and behavior itself (Lam 1999;
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Pomazal and Jaccard 1976; Schwartz and Tessler 1972; Sparks and Shepherd 2002;
Sparks, Shepherd, and Frewer 1995;Warburton and Terry 2000). Findings from
this research demonstrate that moral obligation has independent effects on attitudes
as well (Sparks and Shepherd 2002). We argue that moral obligations interact with
subjective norms (significant others’ influences). However, such an interaction and
its effect on behavior have largely been ignored, save one study by Baron (2006).
This is of particular interest when a strong moral obligation to a significant other
is associated with strong behavioral expectations by that same significant other. In
our case, feedlot veterinarians may be more likely to recommend the use of
antibiotics in a given situation if they sense they (a) have a moral obligation to
others in their network to do so, and (b) perceive that these others strongly support
their doing so. However, feedlot veterinarians may be less likely to recommend
antibiotics if they feel less moral obligation toward others, despite those others’
social pressures to use antibiotics. Again, moral obligations felt by feedlot
veterinarians likely vary across type of significant other as well as across situations
of use. Early work that considered moral obligations examined only a general sense
of moral duty that feedlot veterinarians felt in using antibiotics in feedlot cattle
(McIntosh et al. 2009), rather than moral obligations toward specific significant
others in the feedlot industry, namely, persons and organizations that veterinarians
perceive as social pressures on them to use/not use antibiotics in specific situations. 
The feedlot can be viewed as a network of relationships among different
interested parties, including other feedlot veterinarians, animal nutritionists, feedlot
owner/operators, retained owners of cattle, retailers, consumers, packers,
pharmaceutical company representatives, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), veterinary professional organizations, and state licensing boards. We
perceive that these significant others differ from one another in terms of
relationship type and obligations. Other feedlot veterinarians and feedlot
nutritionists represent peers and working partners. Feedlot veterinarians are few
and may share information with one another through professional organization
meetings, continuing education courses, and other peer networks. Even if they do
not, they may perceive other veterinarians as a key reference group. In addition, as
prescribing antibiotics for feedlot cattle often involves mixing them in cattle feed,
feedlot veterinarians often consult with nutritionists before making
recommendations regarding antibiotic use. Feedlot veterinarians have financial
obligations to feedlot clients (i.e., managers/owners of the feedlots, who usually sell
feedlot cattle to meat packers) as well as retained owners of cattle (i.e., individuals
who place their cattle temporarily in the hands of the feedlot operator for weight
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gain, but once this is done, sell these cattle to meat packers on their own). As
suggested earlier, feedlot veterinarians who also perceive pressures from the food
consumer sector of society (e.g., meat packers, beef retailers, and beef
consumers)—while not wishing animals to suffer—have indicated concerns about
some uses of antibiotics in food animals (Brewer and Rojas 2008). A fourth group
of others consists of organizations and agencies that provide ethical guidelines or
rules and regulations regarding antibiotic use in cattle; these include professional
veterinary organizations such as the American Veterinary Medicine Association
(AVMA), American Association of Bovine Practitioners (AABP) and the Association
of Veterinary Consultants (AVC); the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA);
and state-level veterinary licensing boards. A group that stands alone includes
various pharmaceutical companies that send sales personnel to feedlots to promote
the use of the companies’ various drugs, including antibiotics, and provide advice
via the “technical service veterinarians” that they employ. This group applies
pressure on feedlot operators and feedlot veterinarians to use antibiotics under
almost all possible circumstances, but feedlot operators and veterinarians are likely
to feel less morally obligated to these companies. We argue that the presence of
moral obligations among feedlot veterinarians (a) renders attitudes toward
antibiotic use more positive and (b) increases the frequency with which they
recommend the use of antibiotics.
Feedlot veterinary medicine involves decision-making in situations such as
whether and when to use antibiotics to treat acutely sick, chronically sick, at-risk,
and high-risk cattle with antibiotics. The distinction between acutely sick and
chronically sick cattle (i.e., disease of recent onset; reappearing disease) is found in
veterinary medical texts (see Radostits 2001), whereas the distinction between at-
risk and high-risk cattle has been made by individuals associated with the feedlot
industry (Dean 2005). Antibiotic use in these four situations elicits differences
concerning therapeutic (i.e., to treat a sick animal) versus subtherapeutic use (i.e.,
to prevent an animal or group of animals from becoming sick) and in financial
cost/benefit evaluations. The costs and benefits of antibiotic use vary across these
types of use, and each member of the feedlot industry has a stake in the outcome of
such uses. For example, the FDA recognizes the importance of antibiotic use in
acutely sick or chronically sick cattle, and for controlling disease during outbreaks,
but calls for “judicious use of antibiotics” to prevent cattle from becoming sick,
listing a set of criteria that define judicious use (U.S. Food and Drug Administration
2009:2). 
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In this study, we investigated the interrelations among moral obligations
toward, and behavioral expectations from, the aforementioned 11 significant other
groups in the feedlot industry to determine their joint influences on attitudes
toward antibiotic use and recommendations to use antibiotics in feedlot cattle,
drawing data from a random sample of feedlot veterinarians. We anticipated that
moral obligations to others in the feedlot network would increase the effect of social
pressures from those others both on feedlot veterinarians’ favorable attitudes
toward using antibiotics in cattle and on those veterinarians’ recommendations to
use antibiotics in cattle. The goals of the study were: (1) to determine the utility of
a modified theory of planned behavior model (one that contains moral obligations
to significant others) in the study of antibiotic use in the feedlot cattle industry, and
(2) to determine the usefulness of including interaction terms involving subjective
norms and moral obligations in such models. We accomplished these goals by
running three models for each of the four situations. The first model (Model 1)
contains behavioral beliefs, economic necessity, and subjective norms (e.g.,
perception that feedlot managers pressure the veterinarians to use antibiotics in
acutely sick cattle). In line with this study’s first goal, the second model (Model 2)
contains the same variables as the first model plus moral obligations to the
significant others identified as the source of subjective norms (e.g., perception of a
moral obligation to feedlot managers to use antibiotics in acutely sick cattle). To
accomplish the second goal, Model 3 tests all Model 2 variables plus interaction
terms between the subjective norms variables and their counterpart moral
obligation variables (e.g., perceived social pressure from feedlot managers
multiplied by perceived moral obligation to feedlot managers to use antibiotics in
acutely sick cattle).
METHODS
The questionnaire for this study was developed based on 35 initial qualitative
interviews with feedlot operators, feedlot veterinarians, pharmaceutical managerial
and regulatory staff, government policy and regulatory personnel, technical services
veterinarians, large scale beef retailers, beef packers, antimicrobial resistance
advocacy coalitions, and veterinary journalists (Dean 2005). Content analysis
suggested concepts compatible with those contained in the theory of planned
behavior (Ajzen 1991). These interviews indicated that feedlot veterinarians
identified 11 groups or organizations as sources of social pressure. These 11 became
our indicators of significant others’ influence. Furthermore, many of these same
groups/organizations, as well as the cattle themselves, were mentioned when moral
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issues in the feedlot industry were discussed. We thus based our questions
regarding moral obligations on the same list of significant others. Although we
added cattle as a source of moral obligation, we do not include this moral obligation
in the present paper because it has no counterpart among the significant others. We
do not believe that cattle expect veterinarians to treat them with antibiotics. It is
possible, however, that perceived moral obligations to cattle may interact with
social pressures from feedlot clients or others. We return to this possibility in our
conclusions.
Sample
We drew a random sample from membership lists of the American Association
of Bovine Practitioners (AABP) and the Association of Veterinary Consultants
(AVC), which led to a random sample of 325 feedlot veterinarians practicing in 37
different states. The membership of AABP numbers around 4,800, whereas AVC’s
membership is close to 720. Roughly 45% of AVC members also belong to AABP,
however, less than 10% of AABP members belong to AVC.  Following the Dillman*
method, we sent a letter to these veterinarians alerting them to our research; one
week later, we mailed the questionnaire itself, followed 10 days later by a postcard
reminder. Ten days after that, a second copy of the questionnaire was mailed to the
sampled veterinarians. Nearly 80 of the veterinarians contacted stated that they no
longer practiced feedlot medicine. One hundred and three feedlot veterinarians (a
42% response rate) completed our 18-page questionnaire investigating their
attitudes, beliefs, norms, moral obligations, current recommendation practices
regarding the use of antibiotics in feedlot cattle, and intentions regarding antibiotic
use. Response rates of large animal veterinarians have traditionally been low; a
recent study that employed a much shorter questionnaire than ours produced a
response rate of 49% (Misch et al. 2007); similarly, Wright et al. (2008) obtained a
response rate of 41% using a 2-page mail survey and Harling et al. (2009) garnered
52.9% of their sample of veterinarians. Our sample consisted of more than 99% male
non-Hispanic whites; we investigated the degree to which our sample matches the
large animal veterinarian population and we found that less than 1 percent of female
veterinarians have entered and stayed in large food animal medicine (Narver 2007)
and Elmore (2003) reported that 91% of all veterinarians of both genders are non-
Hispanic whites. 
Information obtained from M. Gatz Riddell, Jr., Executive Vice President of the American*
Association of Bovine Practitioners, July 1, 2010.
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The above components of the TPB model were investigated in four models for
intended behaviors concerning antibiotic use in four situations: namely, for acutely
sick cattle, chronically sick cattle, at-risk cattle, and high-risk cattle. As mentioned
previously, the first two categories are found in veterinary medicine texts;
furthermore, all four were mentioned in the qualitative interviews conducted before
constructing the survey instrument. The questionnaire provided definitions of each
of these conditions for the respondents. Thus, cattle in an acutely sick state referred
to cattle with a bacterial disease of sudden or recent onset. Chronically sick cattle
concerned those with a bacterial disease of long duration; unlike acute illnesses,
chronic conditions often represent an extended relapse or protracted illness after
initial treatment has ceased. At-risk cattle were currently healthy, but because of
their age (under one-year-old), they were at some risk of becoming ill following
their introduction into the feedlot. Veterinarians sometimes recommend that such
animals receive antibiotics to prevent diseases. These antibiotics have also been
shown to promote growth through mechanisms that are not well understood. High-
risk cattle were those determined to be at elevated risk for acquiring diseases
because of their histories (e.g., they had recently arrived, been exposed to sick
animals either in transit or in their home pen, or been transported over a long
distance). Veterinarians sometimes recommend that such cattle be provided with a
strategically-timed therapeutic dosage regimen before exhibiting illness themselves
to reduce morbidity or mortality in a group of cattle. Often, an entire pen of animals
(up to 300 head) is treated at once.
Variables
The present application of the theory of planned behavior led to the
development of the following independent variables for each of the four situations
in which antibiotics are commonly used: 1) beliefs about the efficacy of using
antibiotics in cattle, 2) significant others’ expectations regarding the four uses of
antibiotics in cattle, 3) perceived constraints on using (or, not using) antibiotics in
cattle, and 4) perceived moral obligations to significant others to use antibiotics.
Our dependent variables included attitudes toward using antibiotics and the
frequency of recommended use (i.e., the behavior) of antibiotics in feedlot cattle;
however, we also treated attitudes as an independent variable when behavior was
the dependent variable. Because of the high number of significant others involved
in the feedlot network, we formed summary variables. 
As described earlier, to measure subjective norms, a list of 11 significant other
types in the feedlot network of relationships was developed with information from
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qualitative interviews and discussions with key informants in the feedlot industry.
These included other feedlot veterinarians, animal nutritionists, feedlot
owner/operators, retained owners of cattle, beef retailers, beef consumers, meat
packers, pharmaceutical company representatives, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), veterinary professional organizations (e.g., American
Association of Bovine Practitioners), and state licensing boards. Respondents were
asked the extent to which each of these significant others expected them to
recommend the use of antibiotics under each of the four situations described above
(e.g., at-risk cattle), using a bipolar scale of response choices, and how important it
was to the veterinarians to meet the expectations of each of those significant others
(using a uni-polar scale of response choices). The theory of planned behavior calls
for the multiplication of responses to each significant other’s expectation by its
counterpart regarding the importance of meeting the given significant other’s
expectations. Rather than include these significant others as separate variables in
the multivariate analyses, we grouped them. Thus, other feedlot veterinarians and
feedlot nutritionists formed the first group; feedlot owners/managers and retained
owners of cattle formed the second; packers, retailers, and consumers of beef formed
the third; veterinary professional organizations, the FDA, and state licensing
boards comprised the fourth; and pharmaceutical companies made up the fifth. 
To measure moral obligations, we developed a set of questions about each of the
four behaviors. The questions asked veterinarians whether it was their
responsibility to each of the 11 kinds of significant others to recommend antibiotic
use for feedlot cattle in the four situations described above. A 5-point bipolar scale
was used. We also measured veterinarians’ perceptions about the importance of
these responsibilities regarding each of the 11 kinds of significant others. Following
standard TPB model procedures, the scores of responsibilities to each of the 11
kinds of significant others were multiplied by the scores of the importance of
responsibility to each significant other. We used the same categories as above to
group these significant others.
For beliefs about likely outcomes, we asked three questions for each of the four
situations about whether the antibiotic use would likely: 1) improve the health of
their clients’ cattle, 2) be profitable for their clients, and 3) improve the well-being
of their clients’ cattle. Then, we asked a similar set of questions regarding the
importance of these three outcomes for each of the four conditions. Bipolar scales
were used in measuring these two variables. Following standard TPB variable-
handling procedures, the answers for the likelihood of each outcome were multiplied
by their relative importance. Separate principal components analyses were run for
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each of the four conditions and these analyses generated a single factor from three
multiplied variables under each condition.
For perceived behavior control, instead of asking veterinarians the degree to
which they thought that they could control the making of recommendations to use
antibiotics, we asked the degree to which they agreed that economic pressures made
it difficult for them not to recommend antibiotics to cattle in each of the four
situations. As for attitudes toward antibiotic use, veterinarians were asked about the
degree to which they believed they must recommend antibiotic use under each of
the four conditions. A five-point uni-polar scale was used for this question. Behavior
was measured by ascertaining how frequently feedlot veterinarians recommended
to clients the use antibiotics under each of the four conditions (using a 5-point, uni-
polar scale ranging from never to very frequently).
A behavior such as recommending the use of antibiotics is likely associated with
the background of the veterinarians, including their race/ethnicity, education,
gender, and age as well as experience in the feedlot industry; thus such variables
should be controlled for (Conner and Flesch 2001; Lobb, Mazzocchi, and Traill
2007; Martin, Oliver, and McCaughtry 2007). Because the veterinarians in our
study were nearly all male non-Hispanic whites and 99 percent of them had a
D.V.M. (Doctor of Veterinary Medicine) or equivalent degree, we did not control
for these characteristics. However, they differed in other respects. Fifty-five percent
of the feedlot veterinarians were aged between 35 and 54. Veterinarians in the
sample also differed in: 1) the number of years they had practiced feedlot medicine,
2) the types of practice they were engaged in (none; solo; partnership), and 3) the
U.S. state(s) where they practiced feedlot medicine; these variables served as initial
controls in the models. We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine
the effects of subjective norms, moral obligation, and interaction effects of moral
obligation and significant others’ influences on each attitude toward antibiotic use
and on each recommendation to use antibiotics by feedlot veterinarians. Because we
were creating interaction variables for this analysis, we standardized both the
subjective norm and moral obligations variables.
Statistical Modeling
We used hierarchical regression modeling to test the contribution of the
interaction effects to the additive regression models. A partial F-test was used to
test the statistical significance of adding these interactions to the additive models.
This was accomplished by creating equations that include beliefs, perceived
constraints, and subjective norms (Model 1); then adding moral obligations to this
10
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model (Model 2), and finally adding interactions between subjective norms and
moral obligations (Model 3). In cases in which interaction terms were significant,
these interactions were interpreted using graphical representations (available from
the first author on request). As the focus of this paper is on subjective norms and
moral obligations, we discuss only those findings.
RESULTS
Because the control variables (demographics and practice variables) were not
significant in the regression models, they were dropped from the regression models
to conserve statistical power. Because this paper focuses on the impact of subjective
norms and moral obligations, we have confined our comments to the effects of such
norms and obligations on attitudes and behaviors rather than reporting on the
effects of economic constraints and beliefs on attitudes and behavior.
Attitude Models
Table1, Model 1, shows that the greater the pressure (subjective norm)
experienced by veterinarians from pharmaceutical companies, the less likely feedlot
veterinarians had a positive attitude toward using antibiotics in acutely sick cattle.
The second model, which explains a significantly greater amount of variance than
the first, shows that besides social pressure from pharmaceutical companies, social
pressures from rule and norm-making organizations positively affected feedlot
veterinarians’ attitudes toward this use of antibiotics. This model shows, in
addition, that a sense of moral obligation to feedlot managers and retained owners
of cattle increased feedlot veterinarian favorability toward using antibiotics in
acutely sick cattle. Model 3, while not explaining a significantly greater amount of
variance in attitudes toward antibiotic use, indicates that when other feedlot
veterinarians and feedlot nutritionists strongly desired the use of antibiotics in
acutely sick cattle, and when the veterinarian perceived a strong moral obligation
to these persons to do so, this created a more favorable attitude toward this use of
antibiotics. 
In Table 2, Models 1 and 2 show that subjective norms of nutritionists and
other veterinarians positively affected the attitude toward antibiotic use in
chronically sick cattle; that is, the stronger the perceived pressure to treat these
cattle with antibiotics, the more positive feedlot veterinarians were about doing so.
Model 2 explains a significantly greater amount of variance than Model 1, and
Models 2 and 3 indicate that moral obligations toward feedlot managers, clients,
and retained owners of cattle increased feedlot veterinarians’ perceptions that they
11
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must use antibiotics in chronically ill cattle. However, no interaction effects were
found significant in Model 3.
TABLE 1. THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVE NORMS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND
THEIR INTERACTIONS ON ATTITUDE TOWARD ANTIBIOTIC USE IN
ACUTELY SICK CATTLE (n = 90).
MODEL
1
MODEL
2
MODEL
3
Predictors. .................................................................... B B B
Intercept. ...................................................................... 1.073 1.084 1.049
Economic constraints. ............................................... .059 .062 .059* * *
Beliefs about antibiotic use. ...................................... .079 .058 .054*
Subjective norm 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................ -.011 -.041 .033
Subjective norm 2 (clients, retained owners). ...... .049 -.004 .040
Subjective norm 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................ -.002 .002 -.009
Subjective norm 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ........................... .094 .129 .145* *
Subjective norm 5 (pharmaceutical companies). . -.071 -.079 -.091* * *
Moral obligation 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................ .077 .012
Moral obligation 2 (clients, retained owners)...... .130 .140** **
Moral obligation 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................ .008 .011
Moral obligation 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ........................... -.028 -.029
Moral obligation 5 (pharmaceutical companies). -.011 .014
Subjective norm 1 * Moral obligation 1. .............. .138*
Subjective norm 2 * Moral obligation 2. .............. .038
Subjective norm 3 * Moral obligation 3. .............. -.060
Subjective norm 4 * Moral obligation 4. .............. -.028
Subjective norm 5 * Moral obligation 5. .............. -.059
Adjusted R . .................................................................2 .100 .179 .193* ** ***
F-test for model comparisons 2.556 1.279*
NOTES:  p<.05, p<.01, p<.001 (two-tailed test); Other feedlot vets = other feedlot veterinarians,* ** ***
Nutritionists = feedlot nutritionists, Clients = feedlot owner/managers, Retained owners = cattle
owners who have placed their cattle at a feedlot for finishing; once the cattle are ready these owners
retrieve their animals so that they can put them on the market for slaughter. 
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TABLE 2. THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVE NORMS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND
THEIR INTERACTIONS ON ATTITUDE TOWARD ANTIBIOTIC USE IN
CHRONICALLY SICK CATTLE (n = 79).
MODEL
1
MODEL
2
MODEL
3
Intercept. ...................................................................... 2.243 1.628 1.611
Economic constraints. ............................................... .301 .280 .264** *** ***
Beliefs about antibiotic use. ...................................... .501 .399 .391*** *** ***
Subjective norm 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................ .294 .303 .059* **
Subjective norm 2 (clients, retained owners). ...... .160 .136 .069
Subjective norm 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................ -.155 -.238 -1.001*
Subjective norm 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ........................... .173 .183 .045
Subjective norm 5 (pharmaceutical companies). . .006 -.107 .085
Moral obligation 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................ -.014 .007
Moral obligation 2 (clients, retained owners)...... .215 .229*** ***
Moral obligation 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................ -.003 -.019
Moral obligation 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ........................... .001 -.003
Moral obligation 5 (pharmaceutical companies). .207 .220
Subjective norm 1 * Moral obligation 1. .............. .026
Subjective norm 2 * Moral obligation 2. .............. .009
Subjective norm 3 * Moral obligation 3. .............. .098
Subjective norm 4 * Moral obligation 4. .............. -.029
Subjective norm 5 * Moral obligation 5. .............. -.153
Adjusted R . .................................................................2 .472 .549 .540*** *** ***
F-test for model comparisons. ................................. 3.252 .782*
NOTE:  p<.05, p<.01, p<.001 (two-tailed test)* ** ***
In Table 3, Model 1, subjective norms of other feedlot veterinarians and
nutritionists had a positive influence on attitude toward antibiotic use in at-risk
cattle. The more the veterinarians perceived that these significant others wanted
them to use antibiotics in at-risk cattle, the greater the likelihood that they would
hold the attitude that recommending antimicrobial use in at-risk cattle is necessary.
This effect disappears in Models 2 and 3, which also show that the stronger the
perceived moral obligation toward feedlot clients and retained owners of cattle, the
more positive feedlot veterinarians’ attitudes were toward using antibiotics in 
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TABLE 3. THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVE NORMS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND
THEIR INTERACTIONS ON ATTITUDE TOWARD ANTIBIOTIC USE IN AT-
RISK CATTLE (n = 79).
MODEL
1
MODEL
2
MODEL
3
Intercept. .................................................................... 2.486 2.822 2.847
Economic constraints. ............................................. .307 .211 .204** ** **
Beliefs about antibiotic use. .................................... .288 .246 .285*** * **
Subjective norm 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ...................................................... .282 .164 .161**
Subjective norm 2 (clients, retained owners). .... -.099 -.142 -.138
Subjective norm 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). .......................................................... .067 .060 -.012
Subjective norm 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ......................... .087 .096 .180
Subjective norm 5 (pharmaceutical companies). .087 .129 .005
Moral obligation 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ...................................................... .189 .232
Moral obligation 2 (clients, retained owners).... .328 .316** ***
Moral obligation 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). .......................................................... -.161 -.253*
Moral obligation 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ......................... .100 .187
Moral obligation 5 (pharmaceutical companies). -.078 -.053
Subjective norm 1 * Moral obligation 1. ............ -.329*
Subjective norm 2 * Moral obligation 2. ............ .198
Subjective norm 3 * Moral obligation 3. ............ .032
Subjective norm 4 * Moral obligation 4. ............ -.148
Subjective norm 5 * Moral obligation 5. ............ .244*
Adjusted R . ...............................................................2 .445 .503 .534*** *** ***
F-test for model comparisons. ............................... 2.672 1.989***
NOTE:  p<.05, p<.01, p<.001 (two-tailed test)* ** ***
at-risk cattle. Model 3, while not explaining significantly more variance in this
attitude than Model 2, indicates that social pressure from feedlot veterinarians and
nutritionists, when combined with moral obligation to these colleagues, produced
a decline in the attitude that antibiotics ought to be used in at-risk cattle, while
social pressure from pharmaceutical companies and a sense of obligation to such
companies led to a more positive attitude toward using antibiotics in at-risk cattle.
Clearly, however, these effects are minimal. 
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In Table 4, Model 1, perceived pressures from veterinary professional
organizations, the FDA, and state licensing boards to use antibiotics in high-risk
cattle increased feedlot veterinarians’ attitude that they should use antibiotics in
such cattle. In Model 2, none of the moral obligation variables were significant and
the model did not explain a significant amount of additional variance in this
attitude. However, in Model 3, the less moral obligation feedlot veterinarians felt
to rule- and norm-setting agencies, the less positive their attitude was toward using
antibiotics in high-risk cattle. A significant interaction indicates that the stronger 
TABLE 4. THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVE NORMS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND
THEIR INTERACTIONS ON ATTITUDE TOWARD ANTIBIOTIC USE IN
HIGH-RISK CATTLE (n=84).
MODEL
1
MODEL
2
MODEL
3
Intercept. ...................................................................... 2.059 2.214 2.146
Economic constraints. ............................................... .058 .017 .016
Beliefs about antibiotic use. ...................................... .323 .325 .325** ** *
Subjective norm 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................ .026 .027 .041
Subjective norm 2 (clients, retained owners). ...... .034 -.002 .112
Subjective norm 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................ -.067 -.079 -.165
Subjective norm 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ........................... .274 .303 .301** ** ***
Subjective norm 5 (pharmaceutical companies). . .006 -.009 .009
Moral obligation 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................ .043 -.123
Moral obligation 2 (clients, retained owners)...... .054 .124
Moral obligation 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................ .110 .072
Moral obligation 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ........................... -.212 -.293*
Moral obligation 5 (pharmaceutical companies). .181 .278*
Subjective norm 1 * Moral obligation 1. .............. .164
Subjective norm 2 * Moral obligation 2. .............. -.220*
Subjective norm 3 * Moral obligation 3. .............. .037
Subjective norm 4 * Moral obligation 4. .............. -.110
Subjective norm 5 * Moral obligation 5. .............. .188
Adjusted R . .................................................................2 .206 .192 .223*** *** ***
F-test for model comparisons. ................................. .741 2.537*
NOTE:  p<.05, p<.01, p<.001 (two-tailed test) * ** ***
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the perceived moral obligation was to feedlot clients, the greater the effect of social
pressures was from these significant others on feedlot veterinarians’ attitudes that
they should use antibiotics in high-risk cattle. 
Behavior Models
In Table 5, Models 1-3 consistently show that the subjective norms of other
feedlot veterinarians and nutritionists and pharmaceutical companies positively
affected the frequency with which feedlot veterinarians recommended antibiotics in
acutely sick cattle. However, subjective norms from professional organizations, the
FDA, and state licensing boards led to less frequent recommendations for using
antibiotics in such cattle. Model 2 found no effects of moral obligations on this
behavior. Model 3 did not significantly increase the variance explained by Model
2. However, note that the greater the sense of moral obligation feedlot veterinarians
felt toward other feedlot veterinarians and nutritionists, the less social pressure
they felt to recommend antibiotic use in acutely sick feedlot cattle. 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 6 indicate that the stronger the subjective norms from
other feedlot veterinarians and nutritionists, the more frequently feedlot
veterinarians recommended the use of antibiotics in chronically sick cattle. In
Model 2, the greater the sense of moral obligation toward regulatory/ethics setting
organizations, the less likely feedlot veterinarians recommended antibiotic use in
such cattle; however, this model adds an insignificant amount of variance explained
to Model 1. No interaction effects were found significant in Model 3, nor did it add
significantly to variance explained. 
Turning to Table 7, Model 1 demonstrates that the stronger the perceived
social pressure from feedlot owners/managers (clients) or from pharmaceutical
companies, the more frequently feedlot veterinarians recommended antibiotics for
at-risk cattle. Model 3, while not increasing variance explained compared with
Model 2, includes a significant interaction between the subjective norms toward
members of the consumption sector (meat packers, retail sellers of beef, and beef
consumers) and moral obligation to these members. This interaction can be
interpreted as follows: the less feedlot veterinarians feel a moral obligation toward
these groups and perceive that these groups would prefer feedlot veterinarians to
use antibiotics in at-risk cattle, the more frequently these veterinarians
recommended this use of antibiotics. 
Regarding high-risk cattle, Model 1 shows that the feedlot veterinarians who
perceive social pressure from other feedlot veterinarians and nutritionists 
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TABLE 5. THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVE NORMS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND
THEIR INTERACTIONS ON RECOMMENDATION OF ANTIBIOTIC USE IN
ACUTELY SICK CATTLE (n = 90).
MODEL
1
MODEL
2
MODEL
3
Intercept. ...................................................................... .792 .783 .763
Attitude. ........................................................................ .359 .369 .336*** *** **
Economic constraints. ............................................... -.027 -.027 -.027
Beliefs about antibiotic use. ...................................... .126 .129 .142** ** **
Subjective norm 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................
.104 .108 .110** * *
Subjective norm 2 (clients, retained owners). ...... -.043 -.037 .017
Subjective norm 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................
-.022 -.028 .034
Subjective norm 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ...........................
-.144 -.153 -.186** ** ***
Subjective norm 5 (pharmaceutical companies). . .104 .091 .102** * *
Moral obligation 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................
-.027 -.068
Moral obligation 2 (clients, retained owners)...... .006 .017
Moral obligation 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................
-.025 -.007
Moral obligation 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ...........................
.031 .034
Moral obligation 5 (pharmaceutical companies). .036 .045
Subjective norm 1 * Moral obligation 1. .............. .133*
Subjective norm 2 * Moral obligation 2. .............. -.034
Subjective norm 3 * Moral obligation 3. .............. .023
Subjective norm 4 * Moral obligation 4. .............. -.029
Subjective norm 5 * Moral obligation 5. .............. .047
Adjusted R . .................................................................2 .277 .242 .267** *** ***
F-test for model comparisons. ................................. .237 1.530
NOTE:  p<.05, p<.01, p<.001 (two-tailed test)* ** ***
recommend the use of antibiotics in high-risk cattle (see Table 8). In Models 1 and
2, the stronger the social pressure from ethics-providing and regulatory agencies,
the less frequently feedlot veterinarians made this recommendation. However, the
greater their sense of moral obligation to feedlot clients and retained owners of
cattle to use antibiotics in at-risk cattle, the more frequently feedlot veterinarians
made this recommendation. In Model 3, none of the interaction variables were
significant and the model did not significantly increase variance explained. 
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TABLE 6. THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVE NORMS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND THEIR
INTERACTIONS ON RECOMMENDATION OF ANTIBIOTIC USE IN
CHRONICALLY SICK CATTLE (n = 79).
MODEL
1
MODEL
2
MODEL
3
Intercept. ...................................................................... 1.192 1.092 1.219
Attitude. ........................................................................ .502 .503 .523*** *** ***
Economic constraints. ............................................... .054 .079 .050
Beliefs about antibiotic use. ...................................... .036 .023 .017
Subjective norm 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................ .215 .224 .312* **
Subjective norm 2 (clients, retained owners). ...... -.054 -.023 .229
Subjective norm 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................ -.002 -.056 -.157
Subjective norm 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ........................... .079 .116 .224
Subjective norm 5 (pharmaceutical companies). . -.019 -.047 -.082
Moral obligation 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ........................................................ .036 .013
Moral obligation 2 (clients, retained owners)...... -.004 -.002
Moral obligation 3 (packers, retailers,
customers). ............................................................ .017 .022
Moral obligation 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ........................... -.052 -.047*
Moral obligation 5 (pharmaceutical companies). .008 .036
Subjective norm 1 * Moral obligation 1. .............. -.013
Subjective norm 2 * Moral obligation 2. .............. .038
Subjective norm 3 * Moral obligation 3. .............. .017
Subjective norm 4 * Moral obligation 4. .............. -.018
Subjective norm 5 * Moral obligation 5. .............. .058
Adjusted R . .................................................................2 .720 .715 .712*** *** ***
F-test for model comparisons. ................................. .780 .809
NOTE:  p<.05, p<.01, p<.001 (two-tailed test) * ** ***
CONCLUSIONS
Our paper had two goals. The first was to determine whether adding moral
obligations to significant others provided additional information about feedlot
veterinarians’ attitudes about, and recommendations toward, the four prominent uses
of antibiotics in the cattle feeding industry in models that contained social pressures
from these significant others. The second was to determine whether interactions
between these social pressures and moral obligations increased the predictability of 
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TABLE 7. THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVE NORMS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND THEIR
INTERACTIONS ON RECOMMENDATION OF ANTIBIOTIC USE IN AT-RISK
CATTLE (n = 79).
MODEL
1
MODEL
2
MODEL
3
Intercept. .......................................................................... 1.724 2.004 1.769
Attitude. ............................................................................ .387 .320 .380*** ** ***
Economic constraints. ................................................... .137 .123 .119
Beliefs about antibiotic use. .......................................... .188 .200 .116* *
Subjective norm 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ............................................................ .129 .122 .131
Subjective norm 2 (clients, retained owners). .......... .205 .168 .265* *
Subjective norm 3 (packers, retailers, customers). . -.109 -.113 -.159
Subjective norm 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ............................... -.070 -.083 -.089
Subjective norm 5 (pharmaceutical companies). ..... .180 .223 .297* ** ***
Moral obligation 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). ............................................................ .036 .007
Moral obligation 2 (clients, retained owners).......... .137 .187*
Moral obligation 3 (packers, retailers, customers). .055 .091
Moral obligation 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ............................... .118 .052
Moral obligation 5 (pharmaceutical companies). .... -.142 -.156
Subjective norm 1 * Moral obligation 1. .................. .129
Subjective norm 2 * Moral obligation 2. .................. -.229
Subjective norm 3 * Moral obligation 3. .................. .152*
Subjective norm 4 * Moral obligation 4. .................. .089
Subjective norm 5 * Moral obligation 5. .................. .088
Adjusted R . .....................................................................2 .604 .599 .604*** *** ***
F-test for model comparisons. ..................................... .831 1.449
NOTE:  p<.05, p<.01, p<.001 (two-tailed test)* ** ***
attitudes toward, and recommendations to use, antibiotics in the four situations. We
found that, while moral obligations were significant in five of the eight analyses
(attitudes and behaviors toward the four conditions in which antibiotics are
considered in the feedlot industry), adding interaction terms between social pressure
from and moral obligations to significant others added little explanation in most of
these situations. Furthermore, when these interactions were significant, they were not
always in the direction we had hypothesized.
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TABLE 8. THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVE NORMS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND THEIR
INTERACTIONS ON RECOMMENDATION OF ANTIBIOTIC USE IN HIGH-RISK
CATTLE (n = 84).
MODEL
1
MODEL
2
MODEL
3
Intercept. ........................................................................ 1.312 1.336 1.359
Attitude. .......................................................................... .426 .420 .411*** *** **
Economic constraints. ................................................. -.011 .007 .013
Beliefs about antibiotic use. ........................................ .184 .195 .232** ** **
Subjective norm 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). .......................................................... .117 .097 .080
Subjective norm 2 (clients, retained owners). ........ .037 -.057 -.030
Subjective norm 3 (packers, retailers, customers). -.016 .002 -.027
Subjective norm 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ............................. -.161 -.147 -.108* *
Subjective norm 5 (pharmaceutical companies). ... .032 .026 .042
Moral obligation 1 (other feedlot vets,
nutritionists). .......................................................... .128 .142*
Moral obligation 2 (clients, retained owners)........ .136 -.089*
Moral obligation 3 (packers, retailers, customers). .050 .023
Moral obligation 4 (professional organizations,
FDA, state licensing boards). ............................. -.009 -.086
Moral obligation 5 (pharmaceutical companies). .. -.080 -.012
Subjective norm 1 * Moral obligation 1. ................ .020
Subjective norm 2 * Moral obligation 2. ................ .005
Subjective norm 3 * Moral obligation 3. ................ .027
Subjective norm 4 * Moral obligation 4. ................ -.075
Subjective norm 5 * Moral obligation 5. ................ -.025
Adjusted R . ...................................................................2 .490 .502 .476*** *** ***
F-test for model comparisons. ................................... 1.421 .317
NOTE:  p<.05, p<.01, p<.001 (two-tailed test)* ** ***
 Attitudes
Subjective norms and perceived moral obligations affected veterinarians’ attitudes
toward antibiotics across all four conditions, but their effects depended on the
particular condition under consideration. Furthermore, in models in which moral
obligations to others were significant, perceived normative pressures from those same
others were not significant. In part, this was the result of moderate to high
correlations (.30 to .50 in size) between moral obligations to particular others and
perceived normative expectations of those same others; the greater the sense of moral
obligation, the more important social pressures from others became to the feedlot
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veterinarians. Perceived subjective norms had positive effects in three of four cases.
Social pressures from colleagues and co-workers (other feedlot veterinarians and
feedlot nutritionists) led to a more favorable attitude among feedlot veterinarians
toward using antibiotics in chronically ill cattle. Perception of such social pressures
from norm setting organizations (professional organizations, FDA, and state
licensing boards) increased the favorability of veterinarians’ attitudes toward using
antibiotics in acutely ill and high-risk cattle. Perception of pressure from
pharmaceutical companies, however, decreased feedlot veterinarians’ favorability
toward using antibiotics in acutely sick cattle. Earlier research suggests that cattle
owners sometimes pressure veterinarians to use antibiotics in their cattle (Cattaneo
et al. 2009), but such pressures had little influence on attitudes or recommendations
of the veterinarians in our study. However, as noted below, moral obligations to
clients (feedlot operators and retained owners of cattle) led to more positive attitudes
toward antibiotic use in acutely sick, chronically sick, and at-risk cattle 
Finally, despite several individual interaction effects being significant, their
overall contribution to the models (R -change) were insignificant every time, save2
that of the model for feedlot veterinarians’ attitudes about treating high-risk cattle
with antibiotics. Here, social pressures have a stronger effect on feedlot veterinarians’
attitudes toward using antibiotics in high-risk cattle when their sense of moral
obligation to clients and retained owners is low. 
Behavior
While four subjective norms were statistically significant in the attitude analyses,
they were significant seven times in the behavior models. However, five moral
obligation variables were significant in the attitude analyses compared with only two
moral obligation variables achieving statistical significance in the behavior models.
Subjective norms from other feedlot veterinarians and nutritionists appeared in three
of the four behavior analyses and were always positive. In other words, the more
social pressure feedlot veterinarians perceived from their colleagues and co-workers,
the more frequently they advised the use of antibiotics in acutely sick, chronically
sick, and high-risk cattle. However, the more they perceived social pressures from
norm-producing organizations and agencies, the less frequently they advised the use
of antibiotics in either acutely sick or high-risk cattle. The only model in which social
pressure from clients and retained owners of cattle increased the frequency of
veterinarians’ advice to treat cattle with antibiotics occurred in at-risk cattle.
Perceived moral obligations appeared in only two of the behavior analyses. The
perceived moral obligation to norm-setting organizations to use antibiotics was
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associated with a decrease in the frequency with which feedlot veterinarians advised
antibiotics be used in at-risk cattle. As such organizations generally have argued such
use ought to be done ‘judiciously,’ only under a narrow set of circumstances, this is
an anticipated finding. In fact, most of the veterinarians in the sample perceived little
social pressure from these norm-setting organizations, and did not feel a strong moral
obligation to these organizations to use antibiotics in such cattle. 
The only other behavior model in which moral obligation appears is that for high-
risk cattle, and concerning feedlot clients and retained owners of cattle. Here, the
greater the moral obligation to this set of individuals, the more frequently feedlot
veterinarians recommended the use of antibiotics in high-risk cattle. When a herd of
cattle is suspected of being at high-risk of becoming sick, the financial stakes may be
so high that feedlot veterinarians perceive the seriousness of the situation requires the
use of antibiotics in all the cattle in the herd. 
Several additional points are worth considering. Subjective norms or social
pressures have several sources, the most common of which come from peers and
colleagues, suggesting there are informal as well as formal norms governing
veterinarians’ antibiotic use recommendations on feedlots. This provides an
interesting contrast with the more formal expectations by norm-setting bodies. In
addition, social pressure from pharmaceutical companies decreases feedlot
veterinarians’ perceptions that antibiotics ought to be used in acutely sick cattle, but
appears to increase the frequency of their recommending such usage. Here, it is likely
unwanted pressure from pharmaceutical companies may lead to a less favorable view
of such a practice, yet simultaneously increase veterinarians’ knowledge of antibiotics
for the treatment of acutely sick and at-risk cattle, increasing their recommendations
to do so.
Limitations of our Research 
While our sample was relatively representative, it was small and thus the
statistical power of several our models was well below .80. This helps explain the lack
of support for interactions between subjective norms and moral obligations. In
addition, influences other than those tested here operate in the feedlot industry and
impact disease rates and responses to those diseases. Some of this relates to the
increased size of feedlots as the cattle industry has consolidated. Narver (2007) has
argued that this size increase has made it more difficult for veterinarians to
concentrate on the health of individual animals. Thus, they instead give more
attention to overall herd health. Our data indicated no such effects, but this issue
requires further investigation. 
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Because our study was cross-sectional, we were unable to create the typical TPB
model in which current beliefs, attitudes, behavioral controls, and so on predict
intentions regarding future behavior and actual future behavior. The most
comprehensive TPB models collect data at a later point in time to measure and
predict that future behavior; we did not. Future research in this area should endeavor
to include a second wave of data collection in which behavior at a later time is
measured. 
Finally, we note that while our earlier work has generally shown that moral
obligations toward using antibiotics in cattle often have positive effects on beliefs and
attitudes (McIntosh et al. 2009), the present work indicates that the referent of the
moral obligation matters contextually. This analysis can be extended. For instance,
future work should take into account feedlot veterinarians’ perceived moral
obligations to cattle. Preliminary investigations with our data indicate that when
feedlot veterinarians perceived a strong moral obligation to the cattle themselves to
treat those cattle with antibiotics, social pressures from feedlot clients lead to both
more positive attitudes toward, and more frequent recommendations for, the use of
antibiotics under several conditions studied. When moral obligations toward treating
cattle with antibiotics are less strong, social pressures from both regulating/norm-
setting bodies and pharmaceutical companies to use antibiotics in cattle have less of
an effect on both attitudes and behaviors. In other words, attitudes toward antibiotic
use in cattle are less strong and recommendations to use antibiotics in cattle are less
frequent. 
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